Iftekhar Ahmed, Ahmadiyya Archive & Research Centre
Abstract
The “Hungry Judge Effect”, a phenomenon in which judicial decisions are influenced by physiological states such as hunger, has attracted considerable attention in modern cognitive science and legal theory. This article examines the pre-modern Islamic paradigm of embodied cognition, which anticipated this effect by more than a millennium.
This paradigm, rooted in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammadsa and developed by Islamic jurists from the 2nd century AH (8th century CE) and the 9th century AH (15th century CE). It recognised the profound influence of physiological and emotional states on legal decision-making.
Through a detailed analysis of hadith literature and legal writings, this study shows how Islamic scholars formulated a sophisticated jurisprudence of embodied cognition that dealt not only with hunger and anger, but also with a wide range of states that affect judgement. Through the use of methods such as analogical reasoning (qiyas), Islamic jurists extended these principles to ensure fairness and mitigate bias in legal practice.
This article argues that the Islamic legal tradition offers valuable insights for today’s debates on judicial impartiality, decision fatigue and the pursuit of justice. It emphasises the holistic nature of Islamic thought, which integrates physical, mental and spiritual dimensions, and calls for a broader, cross-cultural engagement with historical precedents to understand embodied cognition.
Introduction
The ideal of the impartial, rational judge, uninfluenced by physical needs or emotional states, has long been a cornerstone of Western legal theory. This paradigm, based on Cartesian dualism that separates mind and body, has shaped assumptions about the objectivity of justice for centuries. However, recent advances in cognitive science, particularly in the field of embodied cognition, have challenged this view by showing that cognitive processes are deeply intertwined with bodily states. One of the most striking examples of this is the “Hungry Judge Effect”, a phenomenon in which judges’ decisions are systematically influenced by hunger and fatigue.
While modern scholarship has only recently begun to address the impact of embodied cognition on judicial decision-making, this article shows that Islamic jurisprudence developed a sophisticated understanding of these issues over a millennium ago. Drawing on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammadsa and the writings of early Islamic legal scholars, this study uncovers a pre-modern paradigm of embodied perception that anticipated many of the concerns raised by contemporary scholarship.
Islamic scholars recognised that physiological states such as hunger, anger and fatigue could impair judgement and developed a comprehensive legal and ethical framework to address these challenges. Through methods such as analogical reasoning (qiyas), they extended these principles to a wide range of conditions, ensuring that judges remained in an optimal state for fair decision-making. This framework was not limited to the courtroom but extended to other areas of human activity such as prayer and worship, reflecting a holistic understanding of the relationship between mind, body and ethical responsibility.
This article seeks to bridge the gap between modern and pre-modern perspectives on embodied cognition by examining the rich intellectual heritage of Islamic jurisprudence. It argues that the Islamic legal tradition offers valuable insights for contemporary legal theory and practice, particularly with regard to issues of bias, decision fatigue and the pursuit of justice. By engaging with this historical paradigm, we can arrive at a more holistic understanding of justice that recognises the embodied nature of human cognition.
Embodied cognition and the limits of rationalism: Modern and pre-modern perspectives
Western philosophical and legal traditions have long been dominated by a rationalist paradigm that emphasises the primacy of reason and its independence from the body.1 This perspective, deeply rooted in the Cartesian dualism between mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa), has shaped legal theory and practice for centuries, fostering the ideal of the judge as a detached, objective arbiter of law, uninfluenced by the vagaries of emotion or physiological states.2 However, this idealised vision has come under increasing scrutiny in recent decades, challenged by the rise of embodied cognition, an emerging field of inquiry in cognitive science and psychology.3
Embodied cognition posits that cognitive processes are deeply intertwined with the body’s interactions with the world, arguing that our perceptions, emotions, and even our most abstract thoughts are shaped by our bodily experiences.4 This perspective challenges the traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body, suggesting instead that cognition is fundamentally embodied and situated.5 In the realm of legal decision-making, this implies that judges are not simply abstract reasoning machines but embodied individuals whose judgments may be influenced by a range of factors beyond the purely legal, including their emotional and physiological states.6
One of the most compelling examples of embodied cognition in legal settings is the “Hungry Judge Effect,” a phenomenon first documented in a landmark 2011 study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.7 This study, led by Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-Pesso, analysed over 1,000 parole decisions made by eight experienced Israeli judges over a ten-month period. The findings revealed a striking pattern: the likelihood of a judge granting parole decreased steadily throughout the day, only to rebound dramatically after breaks for meals or snacks. Specifically, the probability of a favourable ruling was around 65% at the beginning of the day, dropped gradually to nearly zero before the break, and then returned to around 65% after the break. This cyclical pattern repeated itself throughout the day.
The authors of the study attributed this effect to mental depletion resulting from the sustained effort of making repeated decisions. They suggested that as the judges’ cognitive resources were depleted, they were more likely to resort to the simpler, status quo option of denying parole. As glucose levels decline, the ability to engage in complex decision-making is impaired, leading individuals to favour simpler, less effort-intensive options.8 In the context of parole hearings, this translates into a greater likelihood of denying parole – the status quo option – when judges are hungry and mentally fatigued. The “Hungry Judge Effect” thus provides empirical evidence for the influence of a seemingly trivial physiological state – hunger – on judicial decisions, highlighting the embodied nature of legal reasoning.
The implications of the “Hungry Judge Effect” are far-reaching, challenging the very foundations of our assumptions about judicial impartiality and the objectivity of legal decision-making.9 If such a basic physiological need as hunger can significantly sway judicial outcomes, it raises the question of what other subtle, often unconscious factors might be influencing legal judgments. This finding has sparked intense debate within the legal academy and beyond, prompting a reassessment of how legal systems can best mitigate biases and ensure a more just and equitable administration of justice.
However, the prevailing discourse surrounding the “Hungry Judge Effect” and embodied cognition more broadly suffers from a certain degree of historical and cultural myopia. It is often implicitly assumed that the recognition of the interconnectedness of mind and body is a uniquely modern, Western phenomenon, a product of recent advances in cognitive science and neuroscience.10 This narrative overlooks the contributions of non-Western intellectual traditions that may have explored similar ideas centuries ago. Such a Eurocentric bias limits our understanding of the history of ideas and restricts the range of perspectives we can bring to bear on contemporary challenges.11
To overcome these limitations, it is crucial to explore alternative paradigms of embodied cognition that may exist in different cultural and historical contexts. This article argues that Islamic jurisprudence, a rich and sophisticated legal tradition often marginalised in mainstream legal scholarship, offers a particularly valuable, yet under-explored, resource for understanding pre-modern conceptions of embodied cognition. By examining a wide range of Islamic legal sources, from the foundational texts of the 2nd century AH (8th century CE) to the later commentaries of the 9th century AH (15th century CE), this study will demonstrate that Islamic scholars not only recognised the influence of physiological states on judgment, including hunger, but also developed a comprehensive legal and ethical framework to address this issue more than a millennium before the advent of modern neuroscience.
The prophetic paradigm: Anger, hunger and the embodied mind in early Islamic thought
While contemporary Western legal thought is only beginning to grapple with the implications of embodied cognition, a rich and sophisticated understanding of the interconnectedness of mind and body can be found in the Islamic legal tradition, dating back to the very beginnings of Islamic jurisprudence in the 2nd century AH (8th century CE). This pre-modern Islamic paradigm of embodied cognition is deeply rooted in the teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammadsa, as preserved in the hadith literature, and further developed by subsequent generations of Islamic legal scholars. By examining these foundational sources, we can uncover a nuanced understanding of how physiological states, particularly anger and hunger, can impact judgment and ethical decision-making, an understanding that anticipates the findings of modern neuroscience by over a millennium.
Central to this Islamic paradigm is a foundational hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammadsa: “The judge should not issue a ruling between two people while he is angry.”12 This hadith, reported by Abu Bakrara and recorded in both Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim – the two most authoritative collections of hadith in Sunni Islam – is considered authentic (sahih) and has served as a cornerstone of Islamic judicial ethics.13
The immediate context of this hadith suggests a concern with the potential for strong emotions, such as anger, to cloud judgment and lead to unjust rulings. Anger, in this view, is not simply an internal, subjective feeling but a physiological state that can directly impact cognitive processes, impairing the ability to reason clearly and impartially.
This understanding of the embodied nature of anger is further reinforced by the broader context of the Prophet’ssa teachings. He is reported to have exhibited physical signs of anger when delivering admonitions or witnessing actions that violated Islamic principles. For instance, Abu Mas‘ud al-Ansarira narrated that when a man complained about someone prolonging the prayer, “I never saw the Prophetsa more furious in giving advice than he was on that day.”14 This narration highlights the visible, physiological manifestation of anger, suggesting that it was understood as a state that affected not only the mind but also the body.
While the hadith on anger provides a starting point, the Islamic legal tradition’s engagement with the impact of physiological states on judgment extends beyond this specific emotion. Another hadith, although less widely accepted in terms of its chain of transmission (isnad), explicitly addresses the issue of hunger: “A judge should not pass a judgment except while he is fully satiated (shab‘an) and well-quenched (rayyan).”15 This shab‘an rayyan hadith, narrated by Abu Sa‘id al-Khudrira and recorded, among other sources, in Sunan ad-Daraqutni, as-Sunan al-kubra li-l-Bayhaqi and Musnad al-Harith, is generally classified as weak (da‘if) or even fabricated (mawdu‘) due to concerns about the reliability of its narrators.
However, despite its questionable authenticity, the shab‘an rayyan hadith is significant because it reflects a broader concern within the early Islamic community regarding the potential for hunger to impair judgment. The very existence of this hadith, regardless of its formal status, suggests that the issue of hunger and its impact on decision-making was a topic of discussion and concern among early Muslims. Moreover, as we shall see, the content of this hadith – the idea that a judge should be neither hungry nor thirsty when rendering judgment – is echoed and reinforced by numerous statements and practices of prominent Islamic jurists across different schools of thought. This suggests that the shab‘an rayyan hadith, even if not directly attributable to the Prophet, captured a widely held understanding of the relationship between physiological states and judicial decision-making in early Islamic thought.
It is important to note that the concern with hunger and thirst in the context of judgment was not seen as contradicting the Islamic emphasis on fasting as a spiritual discipline. Fasting, when undertaken as an act of worship, particularly during the obligatory fast of Ramadan, is a temporary abstention from food and drink from dawn till sunset, accompanied by heightened spiritual awareness and self-discipline. While some jurists expressed concern about the potential for voluntary fasting to impair judgment outside this specific context, the month of Ramadan presents a unique case. As demonstrated by Haruvy, Ioannou, and Golshirazi (2017), the religious context of Ramadan, where fasting is a collective act of worship and a central pillar of the faith, mitigates the potentially negative cognitive effects of hunger, even promoting prosocial behaviour.16 In contrast, the shab‘an rayyan hadith, and the broader legal discussions surrounding it, address the issue of involuntary or prolonged hunger and thirst that could unexpectedly affect a judge’s ability to focus and reason clearly during legal proceedings, a concern that remains relevant outside the specific context of Ramadan.
Taken together, the hadith on anger and the shab‘an rayyan hadith provide a foundational framework for understanding the early Islamic perspective on embodied cognition. They suggest that the Prophet Muhammadsa and his early followers recognised that physiological states, such as anger and hunger, could significantly impact judgment and ethical decision-making. This understanding laid the groundwork for a sophisticated jurisprudence of embodied cognition that would be further developed by subsequent generations of Islamic legal scholars, as we shall explore in the following sections.
Developing a jurisprudence of embodied cognition: The contributions of early Islamic legal scholars
The foundational principles articulated in the hadith on anger and, to a lesser extent, the shab‘an rayyan hadith, provided the impetus for the development of a sophisticated jurisprudence of embodied cognition in early Islamic legal thought. This development was driven by prominent Islamic jurists who, through their interpretations of these hadiths and their engagement with the practical challenges of judicial decision-making, elaborated a nuanced understanding of how physiological states could impact judgment. Their contributions laid the groundwork for a comprehensive framework that addressed not only anger and hunger but also a wide range of other conditions that could potentially compromise a judge’s ability to render fair and impartial rulings.
One of the most influential figures in this development was ash-Shafi‘i (d. 204/820), the founder of one of the four major schools of Sunni Islamic law. In his seminal work, Kitab al-Umm, a comprehensive compendium of legal rulings and principles, ash-Shafi‘i provides a detailed interpretation of the hadith prohibiting judgment while angry.
He argues that the core issue is not anger per se, but rather the cognitive impairment that it causes. He identifies two primary concerns: “reduced deliberation” and the potential for anger to “alter one’s reason.” Ash-Shafi‘i explains that anger can lead a judge to rush to judgment without carefully considering all the relevant evidence and arguments, thus undermining the deliberative process essential to sound decision-making. Furthermore, he suggests that anger can distort a judge’s rational faculties, leading them to act in ways they would not have acted had they been in a state of calm composure.
Importantly, ash-Shafi‘i extends this principle beyond the specific emotion of anger, arguing that a judge should be “in a state where neither his temperament nor his reasoning is affected.” He explicitly states that any state that “disrupts his temperament or reasoning” necessitates refraining from judgment. This includes conditions such as illness, fatigue, weariness, or impatience, all of which can “exhaust the mind” and impair cognitive function. This interpretation effectively broadens the scope of the hadith on anger, transforming it from a specific prohibition into a more general principle governing the mental and emotional state of a judge.
Significantly, ash-Shafi‘i also directly addresses the issue of hunger, providing a practical example that resonates with the modern understanding of the “Hungry Judge Effect.” He narrates that ash-Sha‘bi (d. 103-110/721-729), a renowned judge and early Islamic scholar, was once seen “eating bread with cheese.” When questioned about this seemingly unusual behaviour before a court session, ash-Sha‘bi explained, “I am preparing myself for judgment.” Ash-Shafi‘i interprets this anecdote, stating that “food soothes the body’s natural heat, while hunger agitates it and preoccupies the mind with cravings, thus distracting one from sound judgment.” This interpretation clearly demonstrates that ash-Shafi‘i recognised the detrimental impact of hunger on a judge’s ability to make sound decisions, prefiguring the findings of the 2011 PNAS study by over a millennium. He understood that hunger, like anger, could create a physiological state that interfered with clear thinking and impartial judgment.17
Al-Muzani (d. 264/878), a prominent student of ash-Shafi‘i, succinctly summarises his teacher’s position in his Mukhtasar, a concise compendium of Shafi‘i jurisprudence. He writes that a judge should abstain from judgment if affected by “illness, sadness, excessive joy, hunger, drowsiness, or fatigue.”18 This comprehensive list underscores the Islamic legal tradition’s recognition that a wide range of physiological and emotional states can compromise judgment, extending the principle far beyond the specific cases of anger and hunger.
Another key figure in the development of this jurisprudence of embodied cognition is the Hanafi jurist Abu Bakr al-Khassaf (d. 261/874). In his influential work Adab al-qadi, a treatise on judicial conduct and ethics, al-Khassaf dedicates an entire chapter to the issue of “On the Judge When He Is Hungry.” He begins by citing the shab‘an rayyan hadith, despite its questionable authenticity, indicating its relevance to the discussion. He further supports this principle with reports about the practices of esteemed early judges like Shurayh (d. 76-79/695-699), who was known to refrain from judgment when hungry or angry. Al-Khassaf also quotes the advice of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 101/720), the Umayyad caliph and mujaddid of the 1st Islamic century, who instructed a newly appointed judge, “Do not pass judgment while angry or irritable,” and emphasised the importance of “patience” and “forbearance” in dealing with litigants.19
As-Sadr ash-Shahid (d. 536/1141), in his commentary on al-Khassaf’s Adab al-qadi, provides further clarification on the meaning of the shab‘an rayyan hadith. He explains that it does not imply that a judge should be constantly overfed, but rather that he should avoid “excessive hunger or extreme thirst” that could impair his judgment. He further advises against a judge engaging in voluntary fasting on days when he is presiding over court, as “extreme hunger may overtake him, leading to anger and weakness, which in turn could impair his judgment.” This nuanced interpretation highlights the practical concern with ensuring that judges are in an optimal physiological state to carry out their duties effectively. It is worth noting that this concern with the potential negative effects of voluntary fasting outside of a specific religious context contrasts with the findings of Haruvy, Ioannou, and Golshirazi (2017), who found that the obligatory fast of Ramadan, with its unique spiritual and communal dimensions, can actually enhance prosocial behaviour.20
Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318/930), a renowned legal scholar who attained the rank of an independent legal authority (mujtahid), confirms the established understanding regarding hunger in his al-Ishraf, a work that provides an overview of the views of various legal scholars. He states that it is makruh (disliked) for a judge to issue rulings while hungry. He also relates that Shurayh, when angry or hungry, would stand up and refrain from judging. He further reports that ash-Sha‘bi used to eat at sunrise, and when asked about it, he said: “I regain my calmness before I proceed to judge.” These reports underscore the widespread recognition among early Islamic scholars of the need for judges to be mindful of their physiological state and to avoid making judgments when hungry or otherwise impaired.21
Significantly, Ibn al-Mundhir also quotes the explicit statement of Malik b. Anas (d. 179/795), the founder of the Maliki school of law: “A judge should not judge while hungry.” This direct and unequivocal statement from one of the most authoritative figures in early Islamic jurisprudence solidifies the principle that hunger is a recognised impediment to sound judgment. It demonstrates that the concern with the impact of hunger on judicial decision-making was not limited to the Shafi‘i or Hanafi schools but was shared across different legal traditions within early Islam.
These contributions of early Islamic legal scholars, spanning different schools of thought and generations, demonstrate the development of a sophisticated jurisprudence of embodied cognition that went far beyond the specific prohibitions found in the hadith on anger and the shab‘an rayyan hadith. They recognised that a wide range of physiological and emotional states, including hunger, could compromise a judge’s ability to deliberate effectively and render impartial rulings. This understanding formed the basis for a comprehensive framework that guided judicial conduct and emphasised the importance of maintaining an optimal mental and physical state when exercising judgment.
Expanding the framework: The role of analogy (qiyas) in addressing embodied cognition
The development of a comprehensive jurisprudence of embodied cognition in early Islamic legal thought was not solely based on the direct interpretation of hadiths related to anger and hunger. A crucial role was played by the principle of analogical reasoning (qiyas), a method of legal reasoning that allows jurists to extend rulings from established cases to new situations based on shared underlying causes or rationales.22 Through the sophisticated application of qiyas, Islamic scholars were able to expand the framework addressing the impact of physiological states on judgment, moving beyond the specific instances of anger and hunger to encompass a wide range of conditions that could similarly impair a judge’s cognitive capacities.
Qiyas is one of the four primary sources of Islamic law. It is a method of legal reasoning that involves identifying the effective cause (‘illa) of a ruling in an established case (asl) and extending that ruling to a new case (far‘) that shares the same ‘illa. The application of qiyas requires a careful analysis of the underlying rationale behind a legal ruling to determine its broader applicability.
In the context of embodied cognition, Islamic jurists used qiyas to extend the principle of avoiding judgment while angry or hungry to other physiological and emotional states that could similarly impair a judge’s ability to deliberate effectively. This process involved identifying the shared ‘illa – the underlying reason for the prohibition – and applying it to analogous situations.
One of the earliest and most explicit applications of qiyas in this context can be found in the work of al-Khattabi (d. 388/998), a renowned Shafi‘i jurist and hadith scholar. In his Ma‘alim as-Sunan, a commentary on Sunan Abi Dawud, al-Khattabi addresses the hadith prohibiting judgment while angry. He argues that “other states that share similar characteristics – such as extreme hunger, overwhelming fear, or severe illness – are comparable to anger in preventing a judge from issuing rulings.” Al-Khattabi’s reasoning is based on the identification of a shared ‘illa: the disruption of mental clarity and composure necessary for sound judgment. He effectively extends the prohibition from anger to any state that similarly impairs cognitive function, demonstrating the flexibility of qiyas in addressing new situations.23
Similarly, the prominent Ash‘ari theologian and Shafi‘i jurist al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013) employs qiyas to broaden the scope of the principle. In his at-Taqrib wa-l-irshad, he argues that the prohibition against judging while angry implies a more general prohibition against judging “in any state that prevents the full deliberation necessary for examining claims, evidence, or other required considerations.” He explicitly includes “anger, illness, hunger, thirst, overwhelming joy, profound anxiety, or any other obstacle that prevents the judge from properly fulfilling the requirements of judgment” within the scope of this prohibition. Al-Baqillani’s formulation emphasises the underlying rationale of ensuring the judge’s capacity for thorough deliberation, using qiyas to extend the principle to a wide range of potentially disruptive states.24
Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi (d. 476/1083), another influential Shafi‘i jurist, provides a clear example of how qiyas operates in this context in his work al-Luma‘ fi usul al-fiqh. He uses the hadith on anger as a prime illustration of analogical reasoning, stating that “through reflection, it becomes evident that anger was prohibited because it preoccupies the mind, making hunger or thirst analogous.” Ash-Shirazi identifies the shared ‘illa as mental preoccupation, which can be caused by various physiological or emotional states, and uses this as the basis for extending the ruling to encompass hunger and thirst.25
Perhaps the most sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of qiyas in the context of embodied cognition can be found in the work of the renowned scholar al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111). In his al-Mustasfa, a seminal work on Islamic legal theory, al-Ghazali develops a nuanced framework for applying analogy, emphasising the need to uncover the deeper wisdom (hikma) behind legal rulings.26 He uses the hadith on anger as a key example, explaining that the prohibition is not about anger in itself, but rather about any state that impairs judgment. He writes: “‘A judge should not judge while angry’ – this indicates [that it also applies to] the hungry person, the sick person, and the one who needs to relieve himself, through understanding its meaning.”27
Al-Ghazali further distinguishes between the effective cause (‘illa) and the underlying wisdom (hikma) of a ruling. While anger might be the apparent ‘illa in the hadith, the deeper hikma lies in safeguarding judicial integrity by addressing cognitive impediments. He clarifies: “By wisdom (hikma), we mean only the perceived and suitable benefit, as in the example of the Prophet’ssa statement, ‘A judge must not rule while angry.’ Anger is identified as the reason for prohibition because it clouds judgment and prevents thorough deliberation. This reasoning equally applies to excessive hunger, thirst, or excruciating pain, which are analogised accordingly.”28 This refined analysis allows al-Ghazali to extend the principle beyond the literal wording of the hadith to encompass a broad range of analogous situations based on their shared impact on cognitive function.
The Hanbali jurist al-Kalwadhani (d. 510/1116) also employs qiyas, alongside scholarly consensus (ijma‘), to argue for a broad application of the principle. In his at-Tamhid fi usul al-fiqh, he states that the hadith on anger, combined with ijma‘, establishes that “anything that similarly affects a judge’s mind, such as fear, sorrow, thirst, hunger, or illness, falls under the same ruling.”29 Al-Kalwadhani highlights the role of ijma‘ in confirming the validity of extending the ruling through qiyas, demonstrating how different sources of Islamic law can work together to create a comprehensive legal framework. In his handbook of Hanbali law, al-Hidaya, he reiterates this, giving practical instructions: “He [the judge] then comes out in the best possible state – not hungry, nor overfilled, neither thirsty, nor preoccupied with any matter that might distract him from concentration and understanding.” Al-Kalwadhani then extends this, saying: “A judge should not adjudicate while angry, nor when he is in a state of extreme hunger, thirst, worry, pain, drowsiness, severe cold, oppressive heat, or the need to relieve himself.”30
Ibn Qudama (d. 620/1223), a towering figure in Hanbali jurisprudence, consistently applies qiyas to the issue of hunger and other forms of physical discomfort in his influential works. In Rawdat an-nazir, he explains that the prohibition against judging while angry points to the underlying reason (‘illa) as distraction and impaired judgment, which extends to cases like “hunger or extreme physical discomfort.”31 He further elaborates on this in his al-Mughni, a monumental work of comparative Islamic jurisprudence, where he explicitly includes “extreme hunger, severe thirst” and other conditions that “distract the mind” in the same category as anger.32 He reiterates this in his al-Muqni‘, when he writes under the chapter on the rules for the judge (adab al-qadi), “A judge must not issue judgments while angry, and while holding back the need to relieve himself, and during intense hunger or thirst, and under the influence of anxiety, pain, drowsiness, severe cold causing discomfort, and oppressive heat.”33
Other jurists also employed qiyas to extend the principle to a variety of situations. The Maliki jurist Abu al-Walid al-Baji (d. 474/1081) writes thtat “any state hindering a judge’s ability to thoroughly assess evidence is analogous to anger and should therefore prevent him from judging.”34 Similarly, the Hanafi jurist as-Sughdi (d. 461/1068) writes that the judge “should not issue judgments while hungry, angry, distressed, drowsy, or preoccupied.”35 The Hanbali judge and jurist Ibn Muflih (d. 884/1479) also employs analogy (qiyas) to extend the prohibition to various states, including “intense hunger or thirst, and under the influence of anxiety, pain, drowsiness, severe cold causing discomfort, and oppressive heat.”36
These examples demonstrate the widespread and sophisticated use of qiyas in developing a jurisprudence of embodied cognition within Islamic legal thought. By identifying the underlying rationale for the prohibition against judging while angry or hungry – the need to safeguard cognitive clarity and ensure impartial judgment – Islamic scholars were able to extend this principle to a wide range of analogous situations, creating a comprehensive framework that addressed the multifaceted relationship between physiological states and judicial decision-making. This framework, developed centuries before the advent of modern neuroscience, anticipates many of the concerns raised by contemporary research on the “Hungry Judge Effect” and provides a rich historical precedent for understanding the embodied nature of legal reasoning.
A holistic approach: Embodied cognition in the courtroom and beyond
The concern with the impact of physiological states on judgment in Islamic legal thought was not confined to the courtroom or the conduct of judges. It extended to other spheres of human activity, particularly prayer and worship, reflecting a holistic understanding of the relationship between mind, body, and ethical responsibility. This holistic approach recognised that the same principles of embodied cognition that applied to legal decision-making also had implications for the spiritual realm, highlighting the interconnectedness of all aspects of human conduct in Islamic thought.
The connection between the requirements for sound judgment and focused prayer is explicitly addressed in numerous hadiths. Just as a judge should be free from distractions when rendering judgments, a worshipper should be similarly focused when engaging in prayer. The Prophet Muhammadsa is reported to have said, “When dinner is served and prayer is called, begin with dinner.”37 This hadith, recorded in both Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, suggests that the physiological need for food can be a legitimate distraction that should be addressed before engaging in prayer. It prioritises the need for a focused mind during worship, even if it means delaying the prayer slightly.
Similarly, the Prophetsa instructed, “None of you should pray when food is present or while resisting the call of the two unclean things (i.e., defecation and urination).”38 This hadith, also found in Sahih Muslim, further emphasises the importance of being free from physiological distractions during prayer. It highlights the need for both physical and mental purity as a prerequisite for proper worship, recognising that bodily needs can interfere with the ability to achieve the requisite state of spiritual focus.
These hadiths provided the basis for Islamic scholars to develop a broader understanding of the role of embodied cognition in the context of worship. Abu Talib al-Makki (d. 386/996), an early Sufi master and Shafi‘i scholar, provides a particularly insightful discussion of this issue in his influential work Qut al-qulub. He explicitly prohibits praying while “suppressing the urge to urinate (haqin), defecate (haqib), or wearing tight footwear (haziq),” as these states “distract the heart.” Significantly, he also includes hunger and anger in this list of distractions, stating that “it is also disliked to pray when angry, distressed, or preoccupied with a matter. Similarly, if one is hungry and food is present, one should eat first.”39
Al-Makki further connects this to the hadith, “When dinner is served and prayer is called, begin with dinner,” but clarifies that this applies only when there is sufficient time and when one’s “heart is tranquil.” He even cites a narration, “None of you should enter prayer while angry,” and another, “Do not pray while angry,” reinforcing the connection between anger and distraction. Finally, al-Makki quotes the saying of al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 110/728): “Any prayer in which the heart is not present is more likely to incur punishment than to earn reward.” This statement underscores the crucial importance of presence of mind and concentration during prayer, which is hindered by the very physiological and emotional states that also impair judgment, including hunger and anger. Al-Makki’s discussion clearly demonstrates the parallel between the requirements for focused prayer and sound judgment, as both are seen as being compromised by similar physiological and emotional distractions.40
Al-Mawardi (d. 450/1058), a renowned Shafi‘i jurist, draws a direct connection between the requirements for judgment and prayer in his al-Hawi al-kabir. He argues that since distractions such as hunger are to be avoided during prayer, refraining from judgment while experiencing such distractions “is even more appropriate.” Al-Mawardi’s reasoning highlights the gravity of legal rulings in worldly affairs compared to the personal act of prayer, while still emphasising that both require a focused mind. He explicitly mentions a hadith where the Prophetsa “forbade a man to pray while resisting the call of the two unclean things (akhbathayn).” He also refers to the previously discussed shab‘an rayyan hadith, where the Messengersa of Allah said, “A judge should not judge except while satiated and quenched,” to further support his argument about the importance of judges avoiding physical distractions. Additionally, he cites a version of the angry judge hadith that includes other potentially distracting states: “A judge should not judge while angry, worried, afflicted, sorrowful, or hungry.” While this expanded version is not found in reliable collections, it nonetheless reflects the broader concern among Islamic scholars with the impact of various distracting states on a judge’s ability to make sound judgments. In his discussion, al-Mawardi, like ash-Shafi‘i before him, illustrates the practical application of these principles by relating the practice of ash-Sha‘bi. ash-Sha‘bi would eat before dawn, explaining, “I steady myself, and then I go out to judge between people.” Al-Mawardi’s inclusion of this anecdote further demonstrates a conscious effort among early Islamic scholars to ensure the clarity of mind necessary for just decision-making.41
Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (d. 520/1126), a prominent Maliki jurist, echoes this sentiment in his al-Bayan wa-t-tahsil. He states that “one should not perform prayer unless his mind is free from distractions that might disrupt his focus during the prayer.” He further emphasises the parallel between prayer and judgment, arguing that, similarly, a judge should only make decisions when his mind is clear and unburdened by distractions. He supports this by referencing the same hadith mentioned before, “None of you should pray when food is present or while resisting the call of the two unclean things (i.e., defecation and urination).”42
Abu Bakr b. al-‘Arabi (d. 543/1148), another influential Maliki scholar, reinforces this connection in his al-Masalik fi sharh Muwatta’ Malik. He cites the hadith prohibiting prayer while “pressing their thighs together” – referring to the physical discomfort that can affect focus – as an analogy to the prohibition against judging while distracted. He argues that any state preventing proper comprehension is akin to anger and should be avoided in both judgment and prayer. He also explicitly refers to the angry judge hadith which is also found in the collection of at-Tirmidhi, “A judge must not rule while angry.” This, according to him, is “a point of consensus among scholars, applying to other states, such as hunger or distress, that might distract the judge or cloud their reasoning.”43
Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi (d. 741/1340), also a Maliki jurist, explicitly lists engaging in prayer while “resisting the urge to relieve oneself,” “wearing restrictive garments,” or “in a state of anger or preoccupation with hunger” as disliked (makruh) actions in prayer. This further confirms the consistent concern across different schools of Islamic law with the impact of physiological and emotional states on the quality of worship.44
Zakariyya al-Ansari (d. 926/1520), a prominent Shafi‘i scholar, provides a detailed analysis of the hadith, “There is no prayer [acceptable] in the presence of food that one desires or while one is resisting the two impurities (al-akhbathan).” He explains that this indicates the disliked nature (karaha) of performing prayer under such circumstances due to the “distraction caused to the heart and the diminishment of perfect focus and humility (khushu‘).” He further clarifies that the ruling extends to anything that “preoccupies the heart and diminishes khushu‘.” He draws a parallel between the principles governing prayer and judgment, arguing that just as distractions impair prayer, the prohibition against a judge passing judgment while angry similarly extends to other states that resemble anger, including intense hunger, thirst, distress, and excessive joy. In his discussion, al-Ansari also notes the alleged hadith, “Do not delay prayer for food or anything else,” and reports its classification as weak (ma‘lul), which indicates that satisfying immediate physiological needs such as hunger when food is available before the start of prayer is considered more authentic in the Islamic legal tradition.45
Shams ad-Din al-Birmawi (d. 831/1428), another Shafi‘i scholar, also discusses the issue of extending the rationale of a hadith to other situations through analogy (qiyas). Al-Birmawi cites the opinion of al-Qadi Abu at-Tayyib at-Tabari (d. 450/1058) regarding the permissibility of such analogical reasoning. At-Tabari, when discussing the hadith prohibiting a judge from passing judgment while angry, reportedly argued that this hadith provides the only example of a case where the underlying rationale (‘illa) – mental distraction – invalidates its origin by generalization. Al-Birmawi, however, strongly disputes this claim, arguing that there are numerous other similar cases where analogy is legitimately applied. He cites examples such as the prohibition of praying while resisting the call of nature (al-akbathayn) or the instruction to eat before prayer when dinner is ready, arguing that in both cases, the rationale – lack of concentration – extends to anything causing similar distraction. Al-Birmawi’s critique of at-Tabari’s restrictive view on analogical reasoning, specifically in the context of embodied states affecting religious and legal duties, underscores the dynamic nature of legal interpretation within the Islamic tradition. It also demonstrates the recognition by some scholars of a broader principle of embodied cognition that informs both ritual and judicial practices.46
These discussions among Islamic scholars across different schools of thought and time periods demonstrate a consistent and nuanced understanding of the interconnectedness of mind and body in the context of both legal judgment and spiritual practice. They highlight the holistic nature of the Islamic legal and ethical framework, which recognises that physiological states can significantly impact not only the ability to make sound legal decisions but also the ability to engage in meaningful worship. This holistic approach anticipates modern concerns with embodied cognition and provides a rich historical precedent for understanding the complex interplay between the physical, mental, and spiritual dimensions of human experience.
The pursuit of leniency: Embodied cognition and the avoidance of harsh punishments
The Islamic legal tradition’s nuanced understanding of embodied cognition, particularly its recognition of the impact of physiological states on judgment, is further reflected in a broader principle that permeates Islamic legal ethics: the preference for leniency and the avoidance of harsh punishments whenever possible. This principle, rooted in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammadsa and elaborated upon by Islamic jurists, aligns with the concern for ensuring that judgments are made with a clear and focused mind, free from the potentially distorting effects of hunger, anger, or other forms of physical or emotional distress.
The core of this principle is encapsulated in a hadith attributed to the Prophetsa, “Avoid applying legal punishments as long as you find an excuse to avoid them.”47 This hadith, reported by Abu Hurayrara and recorded in Sunan Ibn Majah, establishes a fundamental orientation towards leniency within the Islamic legal system. It encourages judges to actively seek mitigating factors and to avoid imposing severe penalties unless absolutely necessary, reflecting a deep concern for fairness and a recognition of the complexities of human behaviour and the limitations of human judgment.
This principle of leniency is not arbitrary or based on mere sentimentality. It is grounded in a sophisticated understanding of justice that takes into account not only the letter of the law but also the broader context of each case, including the motivations, intentions, and circumstances of the individuals involved.48 It recognises that human beings are fallible and that their actions are often influenced by a complex interplay of factors, including their physical and emotional states.
The relevance of embodied cognition to this principle becomes apparent when we consider that a judge who is hungry, angry, or otherwise physically or emotionally compromised may be more likely to make hasty or harsh judgments. The cognitive impairment caused by these states can lead to a diminished capacity for empathy, a reduced ability to consider mitigating circumstances, and an increased tendency to rely on simplistic or punitive solutions.49 In this context, the jurisprudence of embodied cognition developed by Islamic scholars provides a legitimate basis for exercising caution and leniency in judgment.
By recognising that hunger, for instance, can impair judgment, Islamic legal scholars implicitly acknowledged that a judge in such a state might not be fully capable of appreciating the nuances of a case or exercising the degree of care and deliberation required for a just outcome. This understanding aligns with the principle of avoiding harsh punishments, as it provides a specific reason to err on the side of leniency when there is a possibility that the judge’s cognitive capacities might be compromised.
A key figure who connects the jurisprudence of embodied cognition with the broader principle of leniency is Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350), a prominent Hanbali jurist and student of the renowned scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). In his I‘lam al-muwaqqi‘in, a handbook specifically designed for the mufti, a jurist who issues legal opinions or fatwas, Ibn al-Qayyim extends the principles governing judicial conduct to the realm of issuing fatwas. He writes, “It is not permissible for a mufti to issue a fatwa during a state of intense anger, extreme hunger, troubling anxiety, unsettling fear, overwhelming drowsiness, or when his heart is preoccupied. Similarly, if he is in a state of pressing need to relieve himself (mudafa‘at al-akbathayn). In any such situation, whenever the mufti senses within himself something that disrupts his balance, tranquillity, or steadiness, he must refrain from issuing a fatwa.”50
This extension of the principle to the mufti highlights the broader applicability of the concern with embodied cognition in Islamic legal thought. It demonstrates that the need for a clear and focused mind, free from the distractions of physiological or emotional distress, is not limited to judges in a courtroom but extends to anyone exercising legal authority or providing legal guidance. Ibn al-Qayyim’s reasoning connects the jurisprudence of embodied cognition with the principle of leniency by implying that a mufti in a compromised state might be more likely to issue a harsh or inaccurate fatwa. By advising muftis to refrain from issuing rulings when experiencing such states, Ibn al-Qayyim implicitly acknowledges the potential for these states to negatively impact judgment, thus reinforcing the importance of avoiding harsh or definitive pronouncements when one’s cognitive capacities might be impaired.
Furthermore, the principle of leniency, coupled with the understanding of embodied cognition, can be seen as a reflection of the Islamic concept of fitra, the inherent human disposition towards good and justice. The assumption is that, in their natural state, free from the distorting effects of negative emotions or physiological distress, humans are inclined towards fairness and compassion. By ensuring that judges and muftis are in an optimal state of mental and physical equilibrium, Islamic jurisprudence seeks to create the conditions for this innate human capacity for justice to manifest itself in legal decision-making.
In conclusion, the Islamic legal tradition’s emphasis on leniency and the avoidance of harsh punishments is deeply intertwined with its sophisticated understanding of embodied cognition. The recognition that physiological states like hunger, anger, and fatigue can impair judgment provides a strong rationale for exercising caution and erring on the side of leniency in legal decision-making. This approach, rooted in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammadsa and elaborated upon by generations of Islamic jurists, reflects a commitment to justice that is both nuanced and humane, taking into account the complexities of human nature and the limitations of human judgment.
Discussion: Implications for contemporary legal theory and practice
The pre-modern Islamic paradigm of embodied cognition, as developed by Islamic legal scholars from the 2nd/8th to the 9th/15th centuries, offers a rich and nuanced perspective on the relationship between physiological states, emotions, and legal decision-making. This historical understanding has profound implications for contemporary legal theory and practice, challenging conventional assumptions about judicial impartiality and providing valuable insights into the challenges of achieving justice in a complex world. By comparing and contrasting this Islamic paradigm with modern scientific findings on the “Hungry Judge Effect” and related phenomena, we can gain a deeper appreciation for the enduring relevance of Islamic jurisprudence and its potential to inform contemporary debates on bias, decision fatigue, and the pursuit of fairness in legal systems.
One of the most striking aspects of the Islamic paradigm is its anticipatory nature. Long before the advent of modern neuroscience and cognitive psychology, Islamic scholars recognised the impact of physiological states such as hunger, anger, and fatigue on judgment. This recognition was not based on empirical research in the modern scientific sense but rather on a combination of careful observation, reflection on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammadsa, and the application of sophisticated methods of legal reasoning, particularly analogical reasoning (qiyas). The fact that these scholars, working within a vastly different intellectual and technological context, arrived at conclusions that resonate with contemporary scientific findings is a testament to the depth and insight of their legal and ethical framework.
Comparing the Islamic paradigm with the modern understanding of the “Hungry Judge Effect,” we find both significant parallels and notable differences. Both acknowledge the fundamental influence of physiological states on decision-making, challenging the notion of the judge as a purely rational, disembodied actor. The 2011 PNAS study provides empirical evidence for what Islamic scholars had posited centuries earlier: that hunger can significantly skew judicial outcomes, leading to harsher decisions. However, the modern scientific explanation focuses primarily on the physiological mechanisms involved, particularly the depletion of glucose reserves in the brain and the resulting state of decision fatigue. While this provides a valuable understanding of the biological processes at play, it tends to reduce the phenomenon to a purely physiological level.
In contrast, the Islamic paradigm offers a more holistic and ethically nuanced approach. Islamic scholars did not have access to the tools of modern neuroscience, but they developed a sophisticated understanding of the interplay between mind, body, and ethical responsibility. They recognised that physiological states could impair judgment, not simply through biological mechanisms but also by affecting a judge’s emotional state, moral reasoning, and overall capacity for empathy and fairness. For instance, al-Ghazali’s distinction between the effective cause (‘illa) and the underlying wisdom (hikma) of a ruling highlights the importance of considering not only the immediate cause of a judge’s impaired judgment (e.g., hunger) but also the broader ethical implications for the pursuit of justice.
Furthermore, the Islamic paradigm places the issue of embodied cognition within a broader framework of ethical conduct that extends beyond the courtroom. The parallel concern with the impact of physiological states on the quality of prayer and worship underscores the interconnectedness of all aspects of human life in Islamic thought. This holistic approach suggests that the pursuit of justice is not simply a matter of applying legal rules but a broader ethical endeavour that requires attention to one’s overall state of being, both physically and spiritually.
These insights have significant implications for contemporary legal practice. While modern legal systems have begun to address issues of bias and decision fatigue, they often do so in a piecemeal fashion, focusing on specific biases or cognitive limitations without a comprehensive framework. The Islamic jurisprudence of embodied cognition offers a more integrated approach, suggesting that the pursuit of justice requires not only procedural safeguards but also a conscious effort to cultivate the right ethical and physiological conditions for sound judgment.
This could inform the design of legal procedures and institutions in several ways. For instance, scheduling regular breaks for judges, providing access to nutritious food and drinks, and ensuring that courtrooms are conducive to focused and calm deliberation could be seen not just as matters of convenience but as essential elements of a just legal process. Similarly, training judges to be aware of the potential impact of their physiological and emotional states on their decision-making could be incorporated into legal education and professional development programs. The goal would not be to eliminate the influence of these factors entirely – an impossible task – but rather to cultivate a heightened awareness and a commitment to mitigating their impact as much as possible. The study by Haruvy, Ioannou, and Golshirazi (2017) provides a compelling example of how religious and cultural contexts can shape the relationship between physiological states and behaviour. Their finding that the obligatory fast of Ramadan enhances prosocial behaviour, despite the potential for hunger to impair judgment, suggests that the spiritual and communal dimensions of this religious practice can transform the experience of hunger, mitigating its negative cognitive effects. This underscores the importance of considering the broader context in which legal decisions are made and the potential for religious or cultural frameworks to shape the impact of physiological factors on judgment.
Moreover, the Islamic emphasis on leniency and the avoidance of harsh punishments when a judge’s cognitive capacities might be compromised could inform contemporary debates on sentencing and judicial discretion. It suggests that judges should be particularly cautious when making decisions that could result in severe penalties, especially when they are aware that they might be experiencing hunger, fatigue, or other forms of distress. This does not imply that judges should always opt for the most lenient option, but rather that they should approach such decisions with a heightened degree of care, self-awareness, and humility.
Conclusion: Towards a more holistic understanding of justice
The pre-modern Islamic paradigm of embodied cognition, as articulated by Islamic jurists from the 2nd/8th to the 9th/15th centuries, offers a profound and historically grounded perspective on the relationship between physiological states, emotions and legal decision-making. This paradigm, rooted in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammadsa and developed through sophisticated methods of legal reasoning, anticipated many of the findings of modern cognitive science, particularly the “Hungry Judge Effect”. By recognising the effects of hunger, anger and fatigue on judgement, Islamic scholars created a comprehensive framework to mitigate bias and ensure fairness in judicial practice.
The Islamic approach to embodied cognition is characterised by its holistic and ethically nuanced nature. Unlike modern science, which focuses on physiological mechanisms, Islamic jurisprudence integrates physical, mental and spiritual dimensions and emphasises the interconnectedness of all aspects of human experience. This holistic perspective is reflected in the parallel concern with the quality of prayer and worship and emphasises the importance of maintaining an optimal state of mind and body in all aspects of life.
The implications of this paradigm for contemporary legal theory and practice are considerable. It challenges the notion of the judge as a purely rational actor and calls for a more nuanced understanding of judicial impartiality. By recognising the embodied nature of cognition, legal systems can take practical steps to mitigate bias, for example by providing regular breaks, access to nutritious food and training judges to recognise the influence of their physiological and emotional state on their decisions.
Moreover, the Islamic emphasis on leniency and the avoidance of harsh punishments when a judge’s cognitive abilities may be impaired provides a valuable ethical framework for modern debates about sentencing and judicial discretion. This approach, rooted in a commitment to fairness and compassion, is consistent with the broader goal of creating a fairer and more humane justice system.
To summarise, the Islamic legal tradition provides a rich historical precedent for understanding embodied cognition and its implications for justice. By engaging with this paradigm, we can transcend the limitations of Cartesian dualism and develop a more holistic and comprehensive approach to legal theory and practice. This cross-cultural dialogue not only enriches our understanding of the history of ideas, but also offers practical insights for addressing the challenges of justice in a complex and interconnected world.
Endnotes:
1. This rationalist tradition can be traced back to the influential philosophy of René Descartes, who famously posited a radical separation between mind and body. See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. The ideal of the detached and objective judge is a recurring theme in Western legal thought. For a classic articulation of this view, see Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), particularly the discussion of the “internal morality of law” and the requirements of judicial impartiality.
3. For an overview of the field of embodied cognition, see Margaret Wilson, “Six Views of Embodied Cognition,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9, no. 4 (2002): 625-636; Lawrence Shapiro, Embodied Cognition (London: Routledge, 2011).
4. See, e.g., George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
5. Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
6. The implications of embodied cognition for legal theory are explored in Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
7. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 17 (2011): 6889-6892.
8. Roy F. Baumeister and John Tierney, Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).
9. For a discussion of how seemingly extraneous factors can impact judicial decision making, see, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, “Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,” Cornell Law Review 93, no. 1 (2007): 1-43; See also: Brian Leiter, “Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Law, ed. Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 355-374.
10. This assumption is often implicit in discussions of embodied cognition, which tend to focus on recent developments in cognitive science without considering historical or non-Western perspectives.
11. For a critique of Eurocentrism in the history of ideas, see, e.g., Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also: Joseph E. B. Lumbard, “Introduction: The Study of Islamic Philosophy Today,” in The Study Quran, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr et al. (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), xxxvii-xlv.
12. Sahih al-Bukhari, Kitab al-Ahkam, Bab Hal yaqdi al-hakim aw yufti wa-huwa ghadban, Hadith 7158; Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Aqdiya, Bab Karahat qada’ al-qadi wa-huwa ghadban, Hadith 1717a.
13. These two collections are considered the most authoritative sources of hadith in Sunni Islam and are referred to as the “two authentic ones” (sahihan).
14. Sahih al-Bukhari, Kitab al-Adhan, Bab Takhfif al-imam fi l-qiyam wa-itmam ar-ruku‘ wa s-sujud, Hadith 702.
15. Musnad al-Harith, Kitab al-Ahkam, Bab La yaqdi al-qadi illa wa-huwa shab‘an rayyan, Hadith no. 461.
16. Ernan E. Haruvy, Christos A. Ioannou, and Farnoush Golshirazi, “The Religious Observance of Ramadan and Prosocial Behavior,” Economic Inquiry 55, no. 4 (2017): 1819-1836.
17. Ash-Shafi‘i, al-Umm (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1983), Vol. 7, pp. 99-100.
18. al-Muzani, Mukhtasar min ʻilm ash-Shafiʻi wa-min maʻna qawlih, ed. Abu ʻAmir ʻAbd Allah Sharaf ad-Din ad-Daghistani (Riyadh: Dar Madarij li-n-Nashr, 2019), Vol. 2, p. 627.
19. Abu Bakr al-Khassaf, Adab al-qadi, ed. Jihad b. as-Sayyid al-Murshidi (Sharjah: Dar al-Bashir, 2023), pp. 96-97.
20. as-Sadr ash-Shahid, Kitab Sharh Adab al-qadi li-l-Khassaf, ed. Muhyi Hilal as-Sarhan (Baghdad: Matbaʻat al-Irshad, 1977), Vol. 2, p. 6.
21. Ibn al-Mundhir, Al-Ishraf ʻala madhahib al-ʻulama’, ed. Abu Hammad Saghir Ahmad al-Ansari (Ras Al Khaimah: Maktabat Makka ath-Thaqafiyya, 2004), Vol. 4, pp. 185-186.
22. For a comprehensive overview of qiyas in Islamic legal theory, see Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 73-86.
23. Al-Khattabi, Maʻalim as-Sunan: wa-huwa sharh Sunan al-Imam Abi Dawud, ed. Muhammad Raghib at-Tabbakh (Aleppo: al-Matbaʻa al-ʻIlmiyya, 1934), Vol. 4, p. 165.
24. Al-Baqillani, at-Taqrib wa-l-irshad (as-saghir), ed. ʻAbd al-Hamid b. ʻAli Abu Zunayd (Beirut: Mu’assat ar-Risala, 1998), Vol. 1, p. 344.
25. Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi, al-Luma‘ fi usul al-fiqh (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2003), pp. 110-111.
26. Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, ed. Muhammad ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Abd ash-Shafi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1993), pp. 9, 251, 309, 330.
27. Ibid., p. 251.
28. Ibid., p. 330.
29. Al-Kalwadhani, at-Tamhid fi usul al-fiqh, ed. Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. Ibrahim (Mecca: Markaz al-Bahth al-ʻIlmi wa-Ihyaʼ at-Turath al-Islami, 1985), Vol. 4, pp. 21-22.
30. Al-Kalwadhani, al-Hidaya ʻala madhhab al-Imam Abi ʻAbd Allah Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Hanbal ash-Shaybani, ed. ʻAbd al-Latif Humaym; Mahir Yasin al-Fahl (Kuwait: Ghiras, 2004), pp. 567-578.
31. Ibn Qudama, Rawdat an-nazir wa-jannat al-munazir fi usul al-fiqh ʻala madhhab al-Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal, ed. Shaʻban Muhammad Ismaʻil (Beirut: Muʼassasat ar-Rayyan, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 203.
32. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni, ed. ʻAbd Allah b. ʻAbd al-Muhsin at-Turki; ʻAbd al-Fattah Muhammad al-Hulw (Riyadh: Dar ʻAlam al-Kutub li-t-Tibaʻa wa-n-Nashr wa-t-Tawziʻ, 1997), Vol. 14, p. 25.
33. Ibn Qudama, al-Muqniʻ fi fiqh al-Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal ash-Shaybani, ed. Mahmud al-Arnaʼut; Yasin Mahmud al-Khatib (Jeddah: Maktabat as-Sawadi, 2000), p. 478.
34. Abu al-Walid al-Baji, Kitab al-Muntaqa: sharh al-Muwattaʼ (Cairo: Matbaʻat as-Saʻada, 1914), Vol. 5, p. 185.
35. As-Sughdi, an-Nutaf fi l-fatawa, ed. Salah ad-Din an-Nahi (Beirut: Muʼassasat ar-Risala, 1984), Vol. 2, p. 772.
36. Ibn Muflih, al-Mubdi‘ sharh al-Muqni‘, ed. Muhammad Hasan Ismaʻil ash-Shafiʻi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1997), Vol. 8, pp. 167-168.
37. Sahih al-Bukhari, Kitab al-Adhan, Bab Idha hadara at-ta‘am wa-uqimat as-salat, Hadith no. 671; Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Masajid, Bab Karahat as-salat bi-hadrat at-ta‘am, Hadith no. 557.
38. Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Masajid, Bab Karahat al-salat bi-hadrat al-ta‘am, Hadith no. 560.
39. Abu Talib al-Makki, Qut al-qulub fi muʻamalat al-mahbub wa-wasf tariq al-murid ila maqam at-tawhid, ed. ʻAsim Ibrahim al-Kayyali (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 2005), Vol. 2, p. 260.
40. Ibid.
41. Al-Mawardi, al-Hawi al-kabir fi fiqh madhhab al-Imam ash-Shafiʻi: wa-huwa sharh Mukhtasar al-Muzani, ed. ʻAli Muhammad Muʻawwad; ʻAdil Ahmad ʻAbd al-Mawjud (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1999), Vol. 16, pp. 33-34.
42. Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, al-Bayan wa-t-tahsil wa-sh-sharh wa-t-tawjih wa-t-taʻlil fi masaʼil al-Mustakhraja, ed. Muhammad Hajji et al. (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1988), Vol. 17, p. 71.
43. Abu Bakr b. al-‘Arabi, al-Masalik fi sharh Muwatta’ Malik, ed. Muhammad b. al-Husayn as-Sulaymani; ʻAʼisha bt. al-Husayn as-Sulaymani (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 2007), Vol. 6, pp. 239-240.
44. Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi, al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 1977), p. 39.
45. Zakariyya al-Ansari, Fath al-ʻAllam bi-sharh al-Iʻlam bi-ahadith al-ahkam, ed. ʻAli Muhammad Muʻawwad, ʻAdil Ahmad ʻAbd al-Mawjud (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2000), pp. 174-175.
46. Shams ad-Din al-Birmawi, al-Fawaʼid al-saniyya fi sharh al-alfiyya, ed. ʻAbd Allah Ramadan Musa (Cairo: Maktabat al-Tawʻiyya al-Islamiyya li-t-Tahqiq wa-n-Nashr wa-l-Bahth al-ʻIlmi, 2015), Vol. 4, p. pp. 1926-1927.
47. Sunan Ibn Majah, Kitab al-Hudud, Bab as-Satr ‘ala l-mu’min wa-daf‘i l-hudud bi-sh-shubuhat, Hadith no. 2545.
48. For a discussion of the concept of justice in Islamic legal thought, see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2002).
49. On the impact of emotions on decision-making, see, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner and Larissa Z. Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115-137.
50. Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lam al-muwaqqi‘in ‘an Rabb al-‘Alamin, ed. Abu ʻUbayda Mashhur b. Hasan Al Salman (Dammam: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 2002), Vol. 6, pp. 150-151.re holistic and comprehensive approach to legal theory and practice. This cross-cultural dialogue not only enriches our understanding of the history of ideas, but also offers practical insights for addressing the challenges of justice in a complex and interconnected world.
